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ABSTRACT
Over the last two years, the use of unsecured debt in Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs) has greatly expanded. Many real estate professionals are watching this new
development with interest. Why is this happening and how does it affect the REIT
industry? On the one hand, unsecured debt allows a greater degree of operational
flexibility than secured debt. On the other hand, the introduction of debt into the REIT's
capital structure may serve to reduce the growth opportunities of the REIT.
In order to explore these issues, statistical studies were performed to investigate the
market reaction to announcements of Initial Public Offerings of unsecured debt by REITs.
Negative Average Abnormal Returns are observed for a sample of twenty one REITs.
These negative reactions are closely correlated with the ratio of the amount of unsecured
debt offered to the total asset value of the REIT. These results provide evidence in
support of two theories; one, that the market no longer regards REITs as growth stocks,
and two, that the majority of REIT investors are taxable entities which realize a higher
rate of return when investing in corporations with lower levels of debt.
Interviews with REIT professionals indicate a growing awareness of financing options
and a thorough understanding of capital structure theory. There is a rationale for the
introduction of debt into the capital structure of a REIT, though the amount thereof
depends upon the asset characteristics of the REIT and the tax status of the REIT
investors. However, the additional scrutiny of management's activities incurred by
introducing unsecured debt may reduce the growth prospects of the REIT.
Finally, the pricing of unsecured debt in relation to secured debt is in accordance with the
risk-return rationale of modern financial theory, from the point of view of both the bond-
holders and the REIT.
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INTRODUCTION
The Real Estate Investment Trust structure is unique in the corporate world in that it is a
slave to external capital sources. Since it is legally required to distribute at least 95% of
taxable income in the form of dividends, it cannot generate significant amounts of
internal capital. Failure to distribute 95% of income results in loss of its tax-exempt
status. Accordingly, cost of external capital is one of the most important factors in a
REIT's ability to grow.
Towards the end of 1994, REITs could no longer look to the public equity markets as a
source of inexpensive capital. As banks and other sources of capital returned to the real
estate market, investors suspected that REIT growth opportunities were diminishing. This
had the effect of raising the REIT's required rate of return, which caused REIT stock
prices to adjust downward. Because of these higher equity costs, REITs looked to the debt
markets as an alternative source of capital. For those REITs able to secure investment
grade ratings, unsecured debt became a viable source of new capital. Last year (1994)
REITs offered $1.6 billion of senior and subordinated unsecured notes', and by the end of
June this year, there had been nineteen offerings of unsecured debt for a total of over $1.8
2billion2
The use of unsecured debt in REITs is a relatively new phenomenon. Traditionally,
REITs had used equity or secured debt to finance acquisitions and developments. This
new strategy begs the following questions: Why are REITs now using unsecured debt?
What are the operational advantages of unsecured debt? How does the marketplace
perceive the use of unsecured debt in REITs?
1 Commercial Mortgage Alert. April, 1995
2 Merrill Lynch Research. June, 1995
Three theories immediately come to mind with which to explain the use of unsecured
debt in REITs. The first are signaling theories, whereby management, through its actions,
sends signals to the marketplace about the financial health of the company. In one case,
the signal sent could be a positive one. If a REIT determines that it needs debt capital,
then its choice of inexpensive unsecured debt may be a signal that it is able to operate
successfully under this debt load. On the other hand, one theory of corporate borrowing is
that firms with high growth opportunities use equity as a capital source, and those with
lower growth potential use debt as a capital source. Therefore, the REIT's use of
unsecured debt may be a signal that it no longer has the growth opportunities it once had.
The second theory is that, with interest rates at relatively low levels, REITs are using this
cheaper, long term debt to pay off existing higher rate secured loans and to simply add
more capital to its financial base.
The third theory is that, since this form of debt is far less restrictive than secured debt, it
provides a greater degree of operational flexibility for the REIT. However, there is
presently much debate within the REIT community as to whether or this is so. This theory
will be more closely examined in the interviews with REIT professionals.
This thesis will attempt to answer these questions in the context of theory by investigating
the reaction of the marketplace to public announcements of unsecured debt by REITs and
by conducting interviews with several REIT analysts and REIT CFOs.
Chapter One will provide an overview of the REIT industry and review the reasons for
the explosive growth of the industry from 1992 to 1994. It will explain the term
"unsecured debt", and will elaborate on why REITs may be using this form of debt now.
Chapter Two will review the existing research that has been done in the field of corporate
debt. It will review the work that has been done in corporate signaling, a field that is
central to capital structure theory. It will also explain from an academic viewpoint why
REITs, a non-taxable entity, should be using debt.
Ultimately, we will need to examine how the existing equity investors perceive the use of
unsecured debt. Accordingly, Chapter Three will analyze the reaction of the marketplace
to announcements of unsecured debt. In particular, it will explain the sources of data and
how the data was identified and gathered and discuss the results in the light of the
theories presented in Chapter 2.
Chapter Four will contain discussions with selected REIT professionals. Issues discussed
will include the maturity of the industry, the optimal capital structure of a REIT, and the
increasing use of unsecured debt. Some of the arguments presented will be analyzed in
regard to classical finance theory.
Finally, Chapter Five will briefly summarize the study and provide some conclusions for
the REIT industry.
THE REIT INDUSTRY AND UNSECURED DEBT
1.1 THE PROLIFERATION OF REITS
The period 1992 to 1994 saw explosive growth in the REIT industry. Industry
capitalization increased from $15.7 billion to approximately $45 billion over that time
period3, and the number of publicly traded REITs went from 142 to 2264. Figure 1
indicates these growth rates.
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Figure 1. REIT Industry Growth5
"For almost two years, there was an average of $1 billion a month in REIT stock being
issued", said Mr. Richard Schoninger, Managing Director and head of the real estate
3 Cohen & Steers. "Real Estate Securities, Status of the US Market". February, 1995.
4 Merrill Lynch. "Sizing up the Equity REIT Industry". August, 1994.
5 Cohen & Steers. "Real Estate Securities, Status of the US Market". February, 1995.
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banking group at Prudential Securities 6. Why did the industry proliferate so much at this
time? What economic factors were in place so that this tremendous growth could occur?
In order to answer these questions, it will be useful to examine why capital flowed into
real estate during the early and mid-1980s, and the subsequent recession of the late 1980s.
There were many factors involved, the first of which was the deregulation of the Savings
and Loan industry in the mid-1970s. In response to the high interest rates and inflation of
the 1970s, Congress repealed Regulation Q, which had limited the investment activities
of the Savings and Loan industry. This caused great changes in the Savings and Loan
industry and encouraged the thrifts to increase the supply of private debt capital to the real
estate industry.
A second factor was the effect of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
on real estate investment. Up to the passage of ERISA in 1974, pension funds and other
institutional investors' portfolios had primarily consisted of stocks and bonds. ERISA
however, mandated a balanced and fully diversified portfolio for pension funds. Real
estate has historically experienced low correlation with both stocks and bonds, and had
shown itself to be an excellent hedge against inflation during the early 1970s, thus
providing evidence that it is indeed a valuable component of a well diversified investment
portfolio. Accordingly, institutional investors became extensive sources of real estate
equity capital.
Finally, the third factor was the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) in
1981. ERTA was designed to boost the economy after the downturn of the late 1970s, and
real estate industry lobbyists were very successful in garnering very favorable tax
treatment of real estate investment. It shortened depreciation schedules to fifteen years,
the shortest they have ever been, and permitted the use of accelerated depreciation. It also
allowed unlimited passive loss deductions, which meant that the non-cash losses
6 National Real Estate Investor. May, 1995.
generated by real estate could be used to offset taxable gains made elsewhere. These tax
provisions made real estate investment very profitable for private equity sources.
Five years later, the consequences of these favorable provisions became very apparent.
The real estate development industry was unique at this time in that the supply of real
estate was dictated not by demand, but rather by the incentives created through tax laws
and banking de-regulation. This caused tremendous levels of building activity, which, in
turn caused vacancy rates to reach record levels. Then in 1986, the Tax Reform Act
(TRA) was introduced, which completely reversed the legislative treatment of real estate
investment. It eliminated the ability to use all forms of accelerated depreciation,
lengthened the depreciation schedules of all forms of real estate, and modified passive
loss laws to make real estate investment far less favorable than other forms of investment.
The modification of the passive loss laws virtually halted the supply of private equity
capital into real estate overnight. Furthermore, these changes combined to force numerous
developments into default. Since a significant portion of these severely troubled
properties had been financed by non-recourse Savings and Loan debt, these high rates of
default played a major role in the Savings and Loan collapse, which was to ultimately
7
cost the American taxpayers over $300 billion .
The collapse of the Savings & Loan industry had three long-lasting effects. One, an
enormous supply of non-performing real estate came on the market as the RTC began
liquidating the failed Savings and Loans' Real Estate Owned (REO) portfolios. Two,
regulators quickly introduced stricter capital standards that all deposit-based institutions
and insurance companies had to maintain, which significantly reduced the availability of
debt capital for real estate. Furthermore, the 'fear factor' associated with lending in real
estate so soon after the recession proved to further reduce the availability of private real
estate debt.8 Finally, the Federal Reserve Bank lowered short term interest rates to the
lowest levels they had been at in thirty years (See Figure 2). However, this had very little
7 Cohen & Steers. "Real Estate Securities, Status of the US Market". February, 1995.
8 Arnold. "Real Estate Investors Deskbook". 1993.
effect on the amount of private debt capital available, as all of the banks had been
discouraged from real estate lending by the new capital standards.
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Figure 2. Federal Reserve Bank Interest Rates. October 1990 - June 1994
Apart from the effects that the S & L collapse had on the private debt markets, there was
one other factor which contributed to the rapid growth of the REIT industry, and that was
the reluctance of institutional to fund real estate in the early 1990s, due largely to the huge
drop in real estate values during the recession.
Consequently, by the beginning of the 1990s, there was very little private real estate
capital to be found. Private equity had been forced out by the tax laws, and private debt
had been forced out by regulatory pressure and fear.
All of these factors combined to force real estate developers and operating companies to
turn to Wall Street and the securitized public equity markets. For many real estate
entities, Wall Street and securitization was the only source of capital available with which
to continue operations. Others saw Wall Street as a way of re-capitalizing the enormous
debt loads that they had placed on their portfolios. In November 1991, Kimco Realty
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Corporation became the first REIT of the 1990s, and started an avalanche of new REIT
IPOs. Many investors, disillusioned at the low returns provided by traditional investment
vehicles such as CDs, jumped at the prospect of earning an 8% to 10% dividend on their
investment in a relatively low interest-rate environment. Not only did the REIT vehicle
offer the individual investor a superior rate of return, but it also offered him the
opportunity to invest in real estate at a level appropriate to his investment portfolio.
Furthermore, REIT investors realized that this was probably a very good time to invest in
real estate. There was an abundance of property on the market, all being offered at very
low prices by owners who had suffered considerable losses and who simply wanted to get
out of real estate. Therefore, the growth opportunities for REITs were enormous;
investors not only received relatively large cash dividends, but could also expect a
considerable return of capital upon sale.
Finally, a pricing disparity had evolved between Wall Street and Main Street which
further enhanced the growth opportunities of REITs. Because of his Cost of private
Capital, the private real estate operator was able to purchase properties, depending on
location and quality, at anything from a 10% to 13% 'Cap Rate'. However, since REIT
investors were quite content earning an 8% to 10% dividend, the REIT could typically
outbid the private investor because its Cost of Capital was much lower.
1.2 THE IPO SLOWDOWN
In late 1994, this REIT boom suddenly came to a halt. A number of potential REITs that
were in the IPO process simply shelved their plans to go public. There were several
reasons for this, the first of which was the rise in interest rates. (See Figure 3)
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Figure 3. Federal Reserve Bank Interest Rates. July 1994 - June 1995
In 1994, in order to maintain control of a rapidly growing economy, the Federal Reserve
Bank raised interest rates six times for a total hike of 250 Basis Points (BP). This was an
enormous jump in one year, and it hit REITs in two ways. One, it reduced the
attractiveness of traditional REIT yields in comparison to other forms of investment. In
order to adequately compensate investors, REITs had to offer an appropriate risk
premium over safer forms of investment which were now offering higher rates than
before. However, with inflation remaining low throughout the 1990s, REIT income was
not rising at the same rate as expenses, so potential REITs were unable to guarantee the
high dividend yields needed to create sufficient investor interest, thus killing their
proposed offerings.
The second effect of the interest rate hikes affected existing REITs more than the new
IPO plans. The higher rates caused floating rate debt service costs to rise considerably.
However, with many REITs owning properties on long term lease contracts, they were
unable to raise rental income to cover these increased costs. This put pressure on the
REIT to maintain dividends, causing investor confidence to fall.
The second reason for the IPO slowdown was the re-emergence of the banks and
institutional investors as sources of private debt in the real estate lending arena. This re-
emergence was brought on by the expectation in mid-1994 that real estate had reached the
bottom of the cycle. Therefore, any real estate loans made were probably some of the
safest loans these institutions would ever make. With these new sources of debt capital
available, many private operators returned to the market and began to bid up the prices of
real estate again, further reducing the REIT's ability to make positive spread investments.
Perhaps the most telling statistic of the maturity of the REIT industry is the movement of
the correlation coefficient of Equity REIT returns to the Wilshire Small Cap Stock Index.
(See Figure 4) In 1990, this correlation coefficient was over 0.90, indicating that REITs
were behaving like small cap stocks. By early 1995, this correlation coefficient had fallen
to 0.209, evidence that the industry is beginning to mature and move away from the rapid
growth of the early 1990s.
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9 Cohen & Steers. "Real Estate Securities. Status of the US Market". February, 1995.
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What does all of this mean for REITs? It means that investors are looking for larger and
more stable REITs with a consistently solid performance. They are looking for
conservative levels of debt, evidenced by the fact that the 89 largest equity REITs have an
average debt to market capitalization ratio of approximately 34%. While this is still
higher than the similar ratio for the companies in the S & P 500, which is about 20%, it is
10far lower than traditional levels of real estate debt
1.3 WHAT IS UNSECURED DEBT?
Due to the large market capitalization and management expertise of some of the larger
REITs, unsecured debt is emerging as a new source of capital. Though it is a viable form
of new capital for the appropriate REIT, it can be considered riskier than secured debt for
the following reasons. One, unsecured debt is lower in priority of repayment. If the REIT
goes bankrupt, secured note-holders are senior in compensation priority. Two, a default
under unsecured debt puts a lien on the entire REIT and affects all operations, whereas a
default under secured debt puts a lien only on the collateralized asset, allowing the REIT
to maintain operations on its other assets to cure the default. However, evidence shows
that the risk premia for both secured and unsecured debt are somewhat comparable. The
reason for this may be that unsecured debt restricts the activities of management and
ensures that the interests of the bond-holders are maintained.
1.4 WHY ARE REITS USING UNSECURED DEBT Now?
It is only in the last few years that many REITs have been able to obtain an investment
grade credit rating which makes this form of debt capital cost effective. Up to now, the
traditional view of real estate was some what distrustful, as evidenced by Fitch in its
report "Rating Unsecured REIT Debt", when it stated,
10 Merrill Lynch. "Sizing up the Equity REIT Industry". August, 1994.
15
"REITs generally are controlled by real estate developers and
developer families. As a general rule, developers have a reputation
for aggressive business strategies. In fact, most developers and
their lenders have suffered the consequences of excess leverage
placed on property in the 1980s, which was facilitated by
developer's optimism and unrealistic cash flow projections.
However, for the appropriate REIT, unsecured debt offers several advantages over both
secured debt and equity. REITs can use this form of debt to improve its cash flow by
paying down more expensive existing secured debt and reduce debt service. Furthermore,
with equity investors looking for yields of up to 12% on REIT stocks today, unsecured
debt is a far less expensive form of capital than equity, sometimes by as much as 300 or
400 BP12 . The second advantage is that it offers the REIT additional flexibility at the
asset level. Proceeds from the sale of an asset can be put to other corporate uses and do
not have to be applied to the unsecured debt service. The third advantage is that, in
today's relatively low but uncertain interest rate environment, unsecured debt can allow
the REIT to lock into quite low interest rates and refinance much of its higher rate debt.
Apart from the relative advantages of unsecured debt over other forms of capital, another
reason that could be behind the use of unsecured debt, and by far the most subtle, is that it
may be a signal to the marketplace that the REIT has limited growth opportunities. When
REITs were experiencing high growth, they didn't necessarily need flexibility, since they
were able to attract equity capital in amounts sufficient to maintain growth. Now that this
growth phase has ended, they need the operational flexibility afforded by unsecured debt
to maintain their position in the market. However, the next question is, what will
investors look for in REIT stocks now that growth has slowed considerably? It cannot be
" Fitch Research. "Rating Unsecured REIT Debt". September, 1994.
12 We do, however, recognize that, in accordance with Modigliani Miller Proposition II, the introduction of lower cost
debt will not lower the overall required rate of return of the REIT, but rather will increase the required rate of return
on equity. This matter will be more closely examined later in this thesis.
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the relatively high yields and growth prospects that were offered in the early 1990s.
Perhaps it is the value of a component of a fully diversified investment portfolio.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
In order to better understand and focus on the questions posed in the previous chapter, a
review of the relevant academic studies is helpful. This review is divided into three
sections. The first is a review of the literature concerning corporate capital structure,
where we examine the rationale for levels of debt and equity. This section will also
contain a review of REIT capital structure. The second section will focus on the signaling
effects of corporate security issuances, where the authors have developed models to
predict the behavior of market values in response to security issuances. Finally, the third
section will contain a study of market reactions for REIT stocks and offer theories to
explain these reactions.
2.1 THEORIES OF CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Much work has been done in the field of corporate financial structure since Modigliani &
Miller published their famous indifference propositions in their papers "The Cost of
Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment" in 1958, and "Dividend
Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares" in 1962. Their first proposition stated that,
in the absence of any taxes, corporation values were indifferent to capital structure. Their
second proposition stated, however, that in the presence of corporate taxes, companies
should borrow as much as possible, since the debt service payments could be used to
reduce taxable earnings. However, this was an unreasonable conclusion, as Jensen and
Meckling observed in 1975,
"Since we know that debt was commonly used prior to the
existence of the current tax subsidies on interest payments, this
theory does not capture what must be some important determinants
of the corporate financial structure."1
Indeed, we observe sizable amounts of debt in REITs today, which do not pay corporate
taxes. Therefore, we need to further examine the theory behind the use of debt and offer
some solutions as to why debt exists in the capital structure of both taxable and non-
taxable corporations.
2.1.1 Myers 14
Myers considers the value of a firm by dividing it into two sections, assets that the firm
already has in place, and growth opportunities, or 'real options', and develops a model
which shows that corporate borrowing is inversely related to the proportion of the market
value of firm that is accounted for by 'real options'. A firm looking at a new investment
opportunity has the option to go ahead if the project is beneficial for the shareholders and
will provide growth in the company. In some states of nature, the firm will exercise its
options to invest or proceed with a new development, and in other states, it will not.
The paper explains why it is rational to limit corporate debt, even in the presence of taxes,
and it specifies an asset characteristic that encourages heavy borrowing. It shows that the
amount of debt "supported by" growth opportunities will be less than that supported by
assets in place, all things held equal. It also shows that companies with very valuable
growth opportunities should never issue risky debt, and that the existence of debt can
actually serve to reduce the value of the company.
The presence of debt will change the firm's actions in some circumstances. It can create
situations where management can serve the interests of the shareholders only by making
sub-optimal investment decisions, i.e., certain investment decisions are passed up because
13 Jensen & Meckling. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure ". Journal
of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, 1976.
14 Myers. "Determinants of Corporate Borrowing ". Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 5, 1977.
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they are deemed too risky for the existing stockholders, even though they offer a positive
Net Present Value (NPV) to the company.
These results are very applicable to the REIT industry. High growth firms and industries,
such as the REIT industry historically, should be predominantly financed by equity alone.
Lower growth industries should generally have a greater amount of debt on their capital
structure. If we look at some financial statistics, we can see that this is, in fact, the case.
Companies with a high proportion of 'assets in place', such as utility companies, would
have very small growth prospects, and so would be expected to have relatively high debt
levels in their capital structure. The Electrical Utility Industry Average Debt-to-Equity
ratio was 0.55 for the year 199315. Compare this to the average Debt-to-Equity ratio of the
companies in the Wilshire Small Cap Growth Index, which was 0.31 in 1994.16
Finally, since a default under unsecured debt will place a lien on the entire REIT, we can
argue that unsecured debt is riskier than secured debt. The presence of risky debt will
reduce the 'attractiveness' of growth opportunities, so by issuing unsecured debt, the
REIT is limiting its growth opportunities.
2.1.2 Maris & Elayan17
Maris & Elayan investigated the rationale for REITs to use financial leverage. They
hypothesized that agency costs and leveraging clienteles are the reasons why REITs
would use debt.
The agency theory rationale for corporate capital structure had been used by Titman 18
Myers and Majluft 9 , and Titman & Wessels 0 . This theory suggests that, if a firm's
15 Moody's Public Utility Manual, 1994.
16 Mr. Jeffrey Ennis. Wilshire Associates, Inc.
17 Maris & Elayan. "Capital Structure and the Cost of Capital for Untaxed Firms: The Case of REITs". AREUEA
Journal, Vol. 18, 1990.
1 Titman. "The Effect of Capital Structure on a Firm's Liquidation Decision". Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.
13, 1984.
bankruptcy created high costs for its customers, then it should use relatively little debt, as
the issuance of risky debt increases the possibility of bankruptcy. Conversely, if
bankruptcy would have little effect on the firms customers, then it should choose a higher
debt/equity ratio. Maris & Elayan stated that REITs should fall into the latter category,
and so should maintain a level of debt in its capital structure.
The leveraging clientele theory is best put by Kim et al.2 when they state that,
"...investors in high tax brackets will prefer to hold shares in
unlevered firms, while investors in low tax brackets will prefer to
hold shares of leveredfirms.. ".22
Maris and Elayan found in the 1985 REIT Fact Book that untaxed investors such as
pension funds are attracted to REITs, suggesting a clientele favoring leveraged REITs.
They performed a statistical regression analysis on sixty one qualified REITs during the
period 1981 through 1987, and found that the leverage favoring clientele effect was
strong in the rationale for the use of debt in REIT capital structures. However, they found
no evidence in favor of the agency theory.
However, the latest evidence on REIT investors would suggest that, unlike 1985, taxed
investors, such as mutual funds and private individuals are the primary investors in REIT
stocks. Many industry analysts point to the fact that the REIT market is still too illiquid
for large institutions to enter. Therefore, the leveraging clientele theory would suggest
that REIT investors prefer to invest in unlevered firms, suggesting negative reactions
from the marketplace to debt announcements.
19 Myers & Majluf. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors
Do Not Have ". Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 13, 1984.
2() Titman & Wessels. "The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice ". Journal of Finance, Vol. 43, 1988.
21 Kim et al. "Financial Leverage Clienteles, Theory and Evidence". Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 7, 1988.
22 Ibid.
2.1.3 Jaffe23
Jaffe developed a theoretical proof that the use of leverage in REITs should not affect its
value. It begins by developing a valuation model for simple partnerships in a taxable
world, and proves that the value of the levered partnership is equal to the value of the
unlevered partnership in a taxable world by showing that the shareholder can undo the
corporate leverage decision by lending if the corporate leverage is too high and borrowing
if the corporate leverage is too low24 . It then goes on to develop this argument in the case
of REITs.
The key to Jaffe's paper is that the individual investor gets the same tax deduction
whether he borrows or the partnership borrows. He does however, review some of the
complications of taxation in REITs, and shows that in certain situations, an all-equity
REIT may be more attractive to the investor if he is taxed.
Finally, Jaffe states that tax ramifications are not the only reason for employing debt.
There are others, such as underwriting costs and bankruptcy costs which also play a major
part in the decision.
If we follow Jaffe's logic in our particular study, the individual investor may find it more
attractive to borrow to invest in an all-equity REIT. Accordingly, we should find
somewhat negative reactions to debt announcements, as we have seen that the majority of
REIT investors are taxable entities or individuals.
2.2 THEORIES ON SIGNALING EFFECTS
When analyzing signals that may be sent to the marketplace by management through their
actions, we assume that the investor is both rational and well-informed, and will always
23 Jaffe. "Taxes and the Capital Structure of Partnerships, REITs and Related Entities ". Journal of Finance, Vol. 46,
1991.
24 Ibid.
act to protect his interests. Therefore, management needs to be careful when deciding
what courses of financial action the company should take. This paper analyzes these
signaling effects and offers an explanation for certain financial strategies that corporate
management has taken.
2.2.1 Myers & Majluf25
Myers & Majluf develop a model to explain corporate financial behavior when a
company must issue stock to undertake a new valuable investment opportunity. The
model shows that, in some states, firms may refuse to issue stock, and therefore may pass
up valuable investment opportunities. The model assumes that management acts in the
interests of the 'old' shareholders and assumes that they are 'passive' investors, where
they will not rebalance their portfolio in response to the new securities. It examines the
effects of asymmetric information, where the managers are assumed to know far more
than the investor about the company and the investment opportunity.
The model is able to explain several aspects of corporate behavior, including the tendency
to rely on internal sources of capital and to prefer debt issuances to equity if external
financing is required. It shows that, if the firm holds 'financial slack', in the form of cash
and short-term marketable securities or unused non-risky debt, then the decision to issue
equity to finance a new project sends a strong negative signal to the market. By issuing
equity, the company is effectively saying to that it would rather use someone else's
capital than its own to finance this new development, as it is unsure that the return offered
will be commensurate with the risks incurred. The presence of cash therefore introduces a
financial discipline into the company. It will not allow the company to take advantage of
investors by issuing stock only when it is overvalued; if investors know that the firm does
not need external capital to invest, then any attempt to do so sends a strong negative
signal.
25 Myers & Majluf. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do
Not Have ". Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 13, 1984.
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What are the ramifications for the REIT industry within the parameters of this model?
The first issue that immediately comes to mind for the industry is that REITs are, by law,
unable to amass large amounts of cash and marketable securities by retaining earnings -
they are mandated to distribute at least 95% of taxable income as dividends. Accordingly,
REITs need to return to the external markets each time they need capital. The paper
shows that the REIT's decision to issue equity should be poorly received by the
marketplace, and firms that issue debt send, at a minimum, 'not as negative' signals to the
market. However, the REIT has the choice of two forms of debt to issue, secured or
unsecured. As previously argued in this thesis, secured debt is less risky for the REIT.
Therefore, the use of secured debt would be more aligned with the interests of the equity
holders of the REIT than unsecured debt.
2.3 PRICE REACTION STUDIES
The REIT structure offers us a unique opportunity to study these hypotheses and theories
on corporate financial structure in the absence of corporate taxes.
2.3.1 Howe & Shilling26
Howe & Shilling examined stock price reactions to new security offerings, both debt and
equity, by REITs. They hypothesized that, since REITs are tax-exempt firms and cannot
utilize debt interest expenses as tax-shields, they have a considerable disadvantage when
competing with taxable firms in debt markets. Accordingly, REIT stock prices should
exhibit negative reactions when debt is issued.
Howe & Shilling analyzed forty three NYSE or ASE listed REITs that announced both
debt and equity security offerings over the time period 1970 through 1985. Within this
REIT sample, there were over one hundred financing events. Seventy three of these were
26 Howe and Shilling. "Capital Structure Theory and REIT Security Offerings". Journal of Finance, Vol. 43, 1988.
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debt offerings, and twenty seven were equity offerings. Howe & Shilling found a strong
positive reaction to debt announcements, a complete contrast to the expected results and
the recent studies of Eckbo and Mikkelson and Partch28
In order to explain the market reaction to the debt announcements, Howe & Shilling
divided the debt offerings into short term debt and long term callable bonds. They noted
that the positive reactions were in response to the short term offerings, which was
consistent with the signaling theory developed by Myers and Majluf 29 and Flannery.
This theory states that when insiders, such as company management, know the firm to
have better credit quality than the market perceives, they will regard the market premia
(on debt of differing maturities) as excessive. However, the least unreasonable of these
premia is on short term debt. Howe and Shilling also offered two further explanations.
One, the fact that the short term debt may reduce the uncertainty involved with the
repayment of the debt and overall company performance, and two, the fact that the use of
short term debt may serve as an additional 'watchdog' on management, perhaps because
bankers are good monitors of management behavior. Therefore, the selection of short
term debt will serve as a signaling device to the market that the firm is actually better off
than the market perceives.
A summary of these theories is presented in Figure 5. These results leave open the room
for this thesis. We are searching for a market reaction to the use of unsecured debt
specifically, both long and short term.
27 Eckbo. "Valuation Effects of Corporate Debt Offerings ". Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 15, 1986.
28 Mikkelson & Partch. "Valuation Effects of Security Offerings and the Issuance Process". Journal of Financial
Economics, Vol. 15, 1986
29 Myers & Majluf. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do
Not Have ". Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 13, 1984.
3 Flannery. "Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice". Journal of Finance, Vol. 41, 1986.
31 Howe and Shilling. "Capital Structure Theory and REIT Security Offerings ". Journal of Finance, Vol. 43, 1988.
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Myers Determinants of Corporate Borrowing Negative Debt should not be present in the capital structure
of growth companies, since it causes management
to make 'sub-optimal' investment decisions on
behalf of the shareholders.
Maris & Elayan Capital Structure and the Cost of Negative Taxable Investors will experience diminished
Capital for Untaxed Firms; The Case earnings if the REIT takes on debt.
of REITs
J affe Taxes and the Capital Structure of Negative Similar to the arguments in Maris & Elayan above.
Partnerships, REITs, and Related
Entities
Myers & Majluf Corporate Financing and Investment Negative The use of risky debt, where default places a lien
Decisions When Firms Have on the entire company, is not in the best interests
Information that Investors Do Not Have of the equity holders.
Howe & Shilling Capital Structure Theory and REIT Negative Similar to the arguments in Maris & Elayan above.
Security Offerings
Figure 5. Summary of Academic Arguments.
ANALYSIS OF STOCK PRICE REACTIONS TO UNSECURED DEBT
ANNOUNCEMENTS
3.1 IDENTIFICATION CRITERIA
A list of REIT debt offerings for the period April 1989 through December 1994 was
obtained from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT). The
unsecured debt offerings noted in this data-set were checked against a list of unsecured
debt offerings obtained from Commercial Mortgage Alert. A list of post-1994 offerings
was obtained from Merrill Lynch Investment Bankers.
A total of forty nine unsecured debt offerings were obtained from these sources. Since we
want to study the market reaction to new corporate strategy, as indicated by the decision
to issue unsecured debt, we only include the Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of REIT
unsecured debt. Twenty nine of these offerings were IPOs of unsecured debt. Three IPOs
were from foreign corporations, and were not included in the data set. One was issued by
a REIT that had been public for only one month, so there was not enough time for the
REIT stock to develop an effective beta (#). Another was from a private REIT, and stock
prices for three other REITs were not available. For an offering to be included in the
sample set, the stock must have at least thirty daily returns in the entire sample period,
and no missing return data in the last thirty days. A summary of these offerings is shown
on Figure 6. This subset formed our data-set.
Announcements of these initial offerings were gathered from three sources, the Wall
Street Journal (WSJ), the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service (DJNS), and the Bloomberg
News Service (BBS), with each news source being used as a cross-check for the other two.
Typically, the two on-line news services, DJNS and BBS, would have reported the
offerings on the same day as the REIT made the announcements, whereas the WSJ would
contain the announcement the day after the REIT management made the announcement.
Unsecured REIT Debt
Issue Amount Interest Fixed/ Rating Term REIT
Date Issuer Ticker ($Mil) (%) Float (S & P) (Yrs) Focus
4/19/95 Associated Estates Realty Corp. AEC 75.00 8.38 Fixed BBB- 5 Multi-Family
10/9/90 American Health Properties AHE 100.00 10.41 Fixed BBB- 9 Health Care
12/6/94 Developers Diversified Realty DDR 100.00 LIBOR+0.85 Float BBB- 1 Retail
5/17/94 ERP Operating LP EQR 125.00 8.50 Fixed BBB- 5 Multi-Family
1/11/95 Federal Realty Trust FRT 100.00 8.88 Fixed BBB+ 5 Retail
9/24/93 First Union Real Estate Investments FUR 100.00 8.88 Fixed BBB- 10 Diversified
3/20/89 Health Care Property Investors HCP 75.00 9.88 Fixed BBB+ 8 Health Care
6/13/94 Health & Rehabilitation Properties HRP 125.00 LIBOR+0.72 Float BBB 5 Health Care
9/28/93 Kimco Realty Corp. KIM 100.00 6.50 Fixed A- 10 Retail
6/20/95 Merry Land & Investment Co. MRY 120.00 7.25 Fixed BBB+ 7 Multi-Family
12/10/90 Meditrust MT 100.00 - Fixed BBB- 10 Health Care
3/30/95 New Plan Realty Trust NPR 100.00 7.75 Fixed A+ 10 Diversified
2/1/94 Property Trust of America PTR 100.00 6.80 Fixed A- 14 Multi-Family
1/4/93 Rouse ROUS 3.00 8.50 Fixed BBB 10 Shopping Malls
2/23/95 Security Capital Industrial Trust SCN 50.00 7.50 Fixed BBB+ 20 Industrial
9/29/93 Taubman Realty Group TCO 200.00 8.00 Fixed BBB+ 5 Super-regional Malls
12/23/94 National Golf Properties TEE 30.00 8.68 Fixed - 10 Golf Courses
2/25/93 United Dominion Realty Trust UDR 52.00 7.30 Fixed BBB+ 5 Multi-Family
2/17/94 Western Investment Real Estate WIR 50.00 7.90 Fixed BBB 10 Retail/Shopping Center
5/10/95 Weingarten Realty Investors WRI 25.00 6.82 Fixed A+ 5 Diversified
12/30/94 Wellsford Residential Property Trust WRP 100.00 T+1.65 Float BBB- 7 Multi-Family
Figure 6
3.2 METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS
A standard event study methodology3 2 is used to examine the wealth effects of unsecured
debt issuance. The event date (day 0) is defined as either the date that the offering is
reported in the DJNS or the BBS or, as explained above, the day before the offering is
reported in the WSJ.
To estimate the abnormal returns associated with unsecured debt issuance, the market
model is used. The abnormal return is estimated as the difference between the actual
market return on the security and the expected return according to the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) theory. Day '0' is defined as the day of the announcement of
unsecured debt. For each REIT, a maximum of 80 daily return observations is used for
the period around the event, starting at day -70 and ending at day +10 relative to the
event. The first 65 days are designated the 'estimation period', and the following 15 days
are designated the 'event period'. The market model parameters, a and P, are estimated
on daily returns from the estimation period.
Therefore, the daily abnormal return (AR) for firm j on day t is defined as:
AR = R;, +(de + RiRmt)
where Rp, is the market return for security j for day t, R,n, is the return on the equal-
weighted market index, and a and P are the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of
firmj, estimated using standard estimation-period regression analysis. The Standard and
Poors 500 (S & P 500) index is used as a proxy for the equal-weighted market index.
Since the dividends for each company in the S & P 500 are added into the index, each
REIT's dividend is added to the market price at the date of payment to ensure that the
total return of the REIT is evaluated.
32 Brown and Warner. "Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies". Journal of Financial Economics,
1985.
In some cases during the estimation period of certain REITs, announcements were made
by the REIT management which could affect the returns for that day and the previous and
following days. In these cases, the returns for these three days are eliminated from the
analysis in order to better evaluate a and #.
The average abnormal returns (AAR,) for each day t over all the firms in the sample are
given by the following equation
1 N,
AARt =- ARj,
N j=1
where N, is the number of firms in the sample. The cumulative average abnormal returns
(CAR) for the event period [day -5 to day +10] are defined as
t=+1O
CAR(-5,+10) = I AAR,
t=-5
3.3 TEST STATISTICS UNDER THE NULL HYPOTHESIS
Given the excess returns generated by the above methodology, the statistical significance
of the event period excess returns is assessed for the sample. The null hypothesis to be
tested is that the Average Abnormal Return (AARt) for each day within the event period is
equal to zero. The Test Statistic (TSt) is the ratio of the day t Average Abnormal Return
(AARt) to its estimated Standard Deviation S(AAR,); the Standard Deviation is estimated
from the time-series of mean excess returns. The Test Statistic (TS,) for any event day t
within the period (-5 to +10) is,
TSt = AARt_
S(AAR)
where the Average Abnormal Return (AARt) was previously defined, and where N, is the
number of sample REITs whose excess returns are available at day t 3 .
The Expected Return, ER, is defined as
1 t=-6
ER =- AAR
65 t=-70
and the Standard Deviation S(AAR,) is defined as
t=-62
() E 0 (AARt -ER)2
64
If the Average Abnormal Returns (AARt) are independent, identically distributed and
34
normal, the Test Statistic is distributed Student-t under the null hypothesis
3.4 RESULTS
We observe an Average Abnormal Return (AARo) on day 0 of -0.521% over the twenty
one REIT sample set, with a t-statistic of -1.50. This is significantly different from zero at
the 15% level-of-confidence interval.
The AARs and CARs for each individual REIT are shown in Appendix A. Of the twelve
REITs which exhibited negative AARos, they ranged from -0.089% in the case of Federal
Realty Trust, to -4.944% in the case of The Taubman Company. These offerings varied in
size from $25 million in the case of Weingarten Realty Investors, to $200 million in the
case of The Taubman Company. All of the REITs that exhibit negative Average
Abnormal Returns on day 0 also exhibit negative Cumulative Abnormal Returns except
Ibid.
1 Ibid.
for two - Equity Residential Properties, which had a positive CAR of 1.134%, and United
Dominion Realty, which had a positive CAR of 2.175%. All of the other REITs had
negative CARs ranging in magnitude from -0.945% in the case of First Union Real
Estate, to -5.929% in the case of Kimco Realty Corporation.
These results present some weak evidence that the market does not look favorably upon
the issuance of unsecured debt by REITs. Perhaps a larger REIT stock sample might
provide more significant results, but unsecured debt issuance by REITs is a relatively new
occurrence, and the sample set has not yet reached a significant size.
Given that these results are suggestive over such a small sample of REIT stocks, we
further investigate whether there is any correlation between the individual AARo for each
REIT and the financial characteristics for that REIT. The AARo for each REIT is
regressed against the following variables for each REIT;
1. The amount of unsecured debt issued. We want to gauge the market reaction
to the effect on the REIT's capital structure. As more debt is issued in this
initial offering, the debt level in the capital structure is probably higher, all
else equal.
2. Whether the debt coupon was fixed or floating. During one of my interviews
with REIT professionals, Mr. David Hegarty, President of Health and
Retirement Properties, Inc., told me that typically, the floating rate debt allows
prepayment without any penalty, whereas the fixed rate debt will only allow
prepayment with a yield maintenance penalty. Therefore, if the unsecured debt
issuance can be paid off in the short term, then we may observe a positive, or
at least 'not as negative' reaction.
3. The Standard and Poors debt rating, with dummy variables introduced. A
rating of A or above is given a dummy value of 1, and any rating below A is
given a dummy value of 0. This coefficient should account for the role of the
rating agency. Obviously, with a lower credit rating, we would expect a more
negative response from the market.
4. The term of the debt. This coefficient relates to the rationale behind the second
statistic above, where we try to isolate the reaction to the announcements of
either short or long term debt.
5. The most recent total asset value of the REIT prior to the announcement of
debt issuance. This data is book value, and not market value, and is obtained
from the most recent 10-Q reports issued by the REIT or the most recent
annual report issued when the 1O-Q was not available. This coefficient relates
to the capital structure of the company. We would expect that the higher
valued REITs would be able to support a higher amount of debt.
6. The ratio of the REIT's amount of unsecured debt to the total asset value of
the REIT. Since these were unseasoned unsecured debt offerings, the total
amount of unsecured debt was simply the value of this offering, and the total
asset value was taken from the most recent financial reports. This coefficient
is a proxy for the capital structure of the REIT, and again, the rationale is that
the higher the level of debt in the capital structure, the more negative the
response from the market.
7. The business focus of the REIT. Since a large number of the issuers were
Health Care REITs, we set the dummy variable equal to 1 for all Health Care
REITs, and 0 for any other REIT focus. The reason behind this coefficient is
that, typically, the health care REIT has short term tenants. Accordingly, the
earnings from the properties are perhaps not as stable as the earnings from a
large shopping mall with long term leases on investment grade tenants.
Therefore, we would expect more negative reactions to unsecured debt
offerings by health care REITs.
The regression data and the results of the regression are shown in Appendix B. These
results indicate a strong negative reaction to the ratio of unsecured debt to asset value (the
coefficient is -0.113), and is statistically different from zero at the 7% level-of-confidence
interval, with a t-statistic of -1.95. While the coefficient for total asset value is also
negative, it is quite small (2.32x10-5). However it too, is statistically different from zero at
the 9% level-of-confidence interval.
The coefficients for the other variables were not statistically significant. The coefficient
for the REIT focus had a t-statistic of -0.38 (71% level-of-confidence interval), the
coefficient for the term of the debt had a t-statistic of 0.37 (71% level-of-confidence
interval), the coefficient for the REIT credit rating had a t-statistic of -0.23 (82% level-of-
confidence interval), and the coefficient for whether the debt was fixed or floating rate
had a t-statistic of -1.59 (13% level-of-confidence interval).
3.5 Do THE STOCK PRICE REACTIONS CONFORM TO THEORY?
In the analysis of REIT stock price reactions, we note a negative reaction to
announcements of unsecured debt issuances. Myers, in his paper "Determinants of
Corporate Borrowing", argues that growth firms, i.e., firms where the largest component
of overall firm value is from growth opportunities should maintain very low debt levels
on their balance sheets. The negative returns exhibited by the REIT stock prices provide
weak evidence in support of this theory. In the REIT financial statistics regression, we
note a negative reaction to ratio of the amount of unsecured debt to the asset value of the
REIT. This result provides further evidence in favor of Myers' argument.
We also note a weak negative reaction to the size, or asset value of the REIT. This may be
due to the fact that the larger REITs are under the scrutiny of more investment and
portfolio managers, so the market reaction to their announcements may be faster and
more definite than the smaller REITs.
Up to now, REITs have grown at relatively high rates, with acquisitions making up the
major portion of that growth. Now, with the reduced availability of positive spread
investments, the REIT industry may be moving from the growth phase towards the
mature phase. These results suggest that the market recognizes this, a fact that may be
further supported by the graph of the correlation of Equity REIT Returns to the Wilshire
Small Cap Stock Index as shown in Chapter 1, where the correlation went from over 0.90
in 1990 to 0.20 in early 1995.
Maris and Elayan, in their paper "Capital Structure and the Cost of Capital for Untaxed
Firms: The Case of REITs", Jaffe, in his paper "Taxes and the Capital Structure of
Partnerships, REITs, and Related Entities", and Howe and Shilling, in their paper
"Capital Structure Theory and REIT Security Offerings", present arguments that the
taxable status of most REIT investors, such as mutual funds and retail investors, would be
better served by lower levels of debt in the REIT capital structure. Their arguments are
similar to Modigliani-Miller Proposition II, where the overall financial returns on the
investment are evaluated through the corporation to the investor. The negative returns
elicited in the study are not inconsistent with these tax-based theories.
Finally, Myers and Majluf, in their signaling paper "Corporate Financing and Investment
Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have", extend Myers'
argument about negative reactions to debt offerings. They argue that the use of risky debt
in investments is not beneficial for the existing shareholders, and as such, any
announcements of risky debt should be negatively received by the market. If we follow
the argument that unsecured debt is riskier for the equity holders than secured debt, then
the negative reactions experienced by the REIT stocks in our study would also support
this signaling theory.
In summary, these results point to two issues within the REIT industry - growth and
investor leveraging clientele. If we look at the issue of industry growth, it is obvious that
the industry grew at an astronomical rate over the past few years. This growth rate could
not be sustained. In mid-1994, many REIT commentators expressed concern that many
REITs were coming public with sub-investment grade assets in their portfolio. If this had
continued, it could have harmed investor confidence in the REIT industry. Now that this
explosive growth has slowed considerably, the market will evolve and consolidate, with
some of the stronger REITs taking over some of the weaker performers. In fact, this has
already happened, with Wellsford Residential Property Trust acquiring Holly Residential
Properties at the end of 1994. While the negative stock returns suggest reduced growth in
the industry, it is not a negative in itself. Rather, it simply collaborates other evidence in
the market that the industry is maturing.
The second issue that should be addressed are the leveraging clientele theories that were
presented in this thesis. The REIT is a very appropriate real estate investment vehicle for
non-taxable institutional investors such as pension funds. However, the industry has not
yet reached a market capitalization which will provide these investors with the liquidity
that they desire. Now that growth has slowed, it may take even more time before the
market capitalization will grow to a level which is appropriate for these investors.
CASE STUDIES
While it is helpful to gauge the investor's reaction to the issuance of unsecured debt, it
may not tell the complete story. In order to obtain a better picture of what is happening in
the REIT industry, it may also be valuable to investigate the rationale behind the
issuances. Consequently, I spoke with three REIT CFOs and a REIT industry analyst and
asked several questions about the state of the REIT market today and the rationale for
issuing unsecured debt. In these discussions, some REIT professionals had interesting
theories on REIT capital structure which are discussed from a theoretical capital structure
and efficient market point of view.
4.1 WHAT HAS CHANGED?
Almost everyone I spoke with agreed that the increasing use of unsecured debt is a sign of
the growing maturity of the REIT industry and a more complete awareness of all of the
financing options available to these new publicly traded companies. 90% of REITs, prior
to going public, had been private developers or operating companies. The traditional
source of capital available to these entities, and that which everyone had been most
familiar with, had been secured debt, or mortgages. Accordingly, the easiest method of
raising capital for these new REITs was to continue to issue secured debt. Mr. Mike
Kirby of Green Street Advisors put it very well when he said,
"During round one of the REIT industry, all of the REITs took the
path of least resistance and went with secured debt. Now in round
two, the big question is, "How do I get cheap capital?". REITs are
now taking the time to review all of the financing options, and for
those with the ability to issue unsecured debt, it is the least
expensive choice of external capital."
While this may provide a rationale for the increasing use of unsecured debt versus
secured debt, we should also examine why REITs are not using equity capital. Several
factors have combined to raise the required return on equity to levels where it is
uneconomical for the REIT to issue it. They are the same factors that caused the REIT
IPO slowdown - the re-emergence of private debt and equity, the emergence of new
secured debt in the form of mortgage conduits, and finally the rise in interest rates which
has reduced the risk premium offered by REIT yields.
Mr. Kirby also recognizes the ability of the REIT to issue unsecured debt. Clearly, not
every REIT is either able or suitable to issue unsecured debt. Those that do so appear to
have made the successful transition from private real estate developer to public real estate
corporation. As REITs have gone public, they have realized that SEC disclosure has
reduced the freedom that traditional developers are used to, and found it difficult to
participate in some of the riskier investments that they would have in the past. Now that
some REITs have issued unsecured debt, they have introduced the additional scrutiny of
the rating agencies. While the traditional developer may not regard this as a positive step,
many would contend that it will force the public real estate industry to adopt more
conservative corporate behavior and better management policy than the traditional private
developer.
Finally, it is only in the last few years that REITs, and the overall REIT market, have
reached a capitalization value that warrants the attention of the rating agencies. Until
recently, there has simply not been enough equity in the industry and REITs had not
achieved a proven track record. Therefore, coupled with the REIT's indifference to
unsecured debt was the rating agencies' unwillingness to issue REITs investment grade
ratings.
4.2 WHAT IS THE REIT's OPTIMUM CAPITAL STRUCTURE?
A REIT's optimum capital structure is dependent upon several factors. At first glance,
since the REIT is a non-taxable entity, it is unable to fully utilize the tax shields generated
by debt interest payments. Therefore, the REIT, in competition with taxable entities, may
find itself at a disadvantage in the debt capital markets. I raised this point during some of
the interviews I had with REIT professionals, and both Mr. Bernard Winograd, CFO of
The Taubman Company, and Mr. Scott Wolstein, CFO of Developers Diversified Realty
Corporation explained to me that REITs are not in competition with taxable firms in the
debt capital markets. There is not such a finite supply of debt that taxable firms are able
to bid up the price to levels where it is unattractive for REITs. The cost of debt is more
dependent upon external factors such as the Federal Reserve Banks' borrowing rates and
the risk profile of the REIT, and less dependent upon aggregate supply/demand
competition for debt capital.
They explained how a REIT may be at an advantage over taxable companies when it
maintains a certain level of debt in its capital structure. REITs must pay out, in the form
of dividends, a minimum of 95% of taxable income. This taxable income is reduced by
whatever interest payments are made by the REIT, and any distributions made in excess
of taxable income are deemed a Return of Capital to the investor. Therefore, all else
equal, if a REIT continues to payout the same dividends with debt in its capital structure
as when it was all-equity financed, investors will realize a Return of Capital, and are able
to defer capital gains tax until the time of sale. REITs are at an advantage over industrial
companies in that, with higher non-cash deductions such as depreciation and
amortization, they may find it easier to distribute a Return of Capital. Therefore, there is a
tax advantage to the shareholder if the REIT maintains a level of debt in its capital
structure.
They cite the blended, or Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WA CC) as the indicator of
optimum debt levels. Since debt is typically cheaper than equity, it is claimed that a level
of debt can be acquired which will not cause the required return on equity to rise to levels
which increase the overall WACC. This claim was corroborated by Mr. Bob Lieber, of
Lehman Brothers, who stated recently in a presentation at MIT,
"Equity investors in REITs do not appear to require any additional
returns for REITs with debt levels of up to about 20% of market
capitalization."
However, this claim is inconsistent with modern corporate capital theory. Clearly, the
required return on equity should rise in inverse proportion to the level of debt in the
REIT. Remember that the WACC of the REIT should theoretically be independent of the
capital structure. So the introduction of more debt into the capital structure of the REIT
should not reduce the overall required return on the assets, but rather should increase
the required return of the equity holders.
Perhaps it can be explained by the fact that the equity investors are being compensated for
the increase in debt by the increase in deferred capital gains. If this is the case, then the
introduction of debt, up to certain levels, can lower the overall WACC of the REIT. The
elusive question then becomes, what is the maximum debt level of the REIT that will
minimize the overall WACC? The precise level of debt will depend on several factors,
including the asset type and the age of the properties and the tax status of the
shareholders. For those properties with high appreciation potential, the Return of Capital
can accrue at a faster rate for the shareholder, so a lower level of debt is required to effect
the same capital gain.
Both Mr. Winograd and Mr. Wolstein agreed that a REIT needs to decide which credit
rating to aim for depending upon its asset base. It needs to weigh the cost advantages of
each discrete credit rating and decide which level of Debt Service Coverage it can
maintain without compromising operations. The asset mix will play a major role in the
REIT's credit rating. To use Mr. Wolstein's example,
"A major shopping mall owner with investment grade tenants on
long term leases has afar more stable and secure cash stream than
perhaps a golf course owner."
The shopping mall REIT is better equipped to maintain an investment grade credit rating
than REITs in other industry sectors, so the industry's tendency to 'decide' on an overall
debt-to-equity ratio ceiling of 50% is somewhat inappropriate given the diverse asset base
of the different REITs.
Mr. Kirby hinted at the 'growth/debt' issue when he said, "many REITs made the mistake
of coming public with already high levels of debt on the balance sheet". If we return to
Modigliani-Miller Proposition II, we can see that high debt levels raise the required rate
of return on the REIT equity. This makes it very difficult for the REIT to make positive
spread investments, which then, in turn, reduces the availability of external capital. If we
expand this to include unsecured debt, we can argue that the risk to the shareholders is
greater when there is unsecured debt on the books, further raising the required rate of
return on the REIT equity.
4.3 WHY ARE REITs ISSUING UNSECURED DEBT?
Perhaps the main reason that REITs are turning to unsecured debt as a form of external
financing is that, for the appropriate REIT, it offers a larger degree of operational
flexibility than secured debt. Mr. Winograd said,
"We think that having the ability to finance by the use of our
balance sheet rather than property by property is one of the
significant advantages to being a public company. In general, we
felt that the flexibility rather than the price was the principal
advantage relative to secured financing. Pricing never has been
materially better than what we could achieve with secured
financing, and in some cases marginally worse, but the flexibility
has several aspects to it."
One aspect of the flexibility concerns the fact that the cash flow from an asset that is
encumbered by secured financing will, to a large amount, go to the debt service for that
particular loan. On the other hand, if the property is financed using unsecured debt, then
its cash flow will be available for general corporate use.
The second aspect of the flexibility is the ability to freely sell the assets on the portfolio.
With secured financing, the proceeds from the sale of an asset will typically go towards
paying down the mortgage on that property. Furthermore, if the property is financed by a
fixed rate, secured loan and is sold prior to the loan maturity, payoff would typically
require a yield maintenance payment, thus further decreasing the cash proceeds available
to the REIT after the sale. On the other hand, the proceeds from the sale of an unsecured
asset are available for general corporate use, with no obligation to use these proceeds to
pay down the unsecured loan. While this ability to freely sell assets may not appear to be
of benefit to many REITs which do not have asset disposition plans, it is a factor that is
looked upon very favorably by the rating agencies as it gives the REIT the ability to raise
cash by means other than traditional sources of debt and equity.
The third aspect to this flexibility is the fact that the administration costs tend to be far
less with unsecured debt than those associated with secured financing. Again, these costs
may vary from REIT to REIT. A REIT with numerous properties would probably see
more cost benefits with unsecured financing than securing each individual property on the
portfolio. Not only are the actual costs less, but also the time costs associated with
unsecured financing are typically far less than those associated with secured financing.
Depending upon property type and size, a secured financing may take anywhere up to six
months, whereas, once the rating agencies have rated the REIT, the unsecured financing
process can take as little as a couple of weeks.
While these advantages are certainly obvious, it can be argued that they do not fully
compensate for the extra risks incurred by the REIT. As previously mentioned, the main
disadvantage of unsecured debt is that a default triggers a lien on the entire REIT, causing
widespread and costly damage. Myers argues that risky debt reduces management's
ability to make optimal investment decisions on behalf of the existing shareholders. This
may reduce the growth potential of the REIT, a theory that may be supported by the
results of our stock price and statistical studies.
I spoke with Mr. Wolstein about the pricing aspect of unsecured debt. He told me that, at
the moment, senior unsecured debt is more expensive than comparable secured financing.
There is a spread of approximately 145 Basis Points (BP) over Treasuries for BBB- rated
unsecured financing, and a comparable secured financing deal would cost approximately
100 BP over Treasuries. However, in the light of modern risk/return analysis, we would
expect this pricing premium to exist. Since the unsecured debt holders are lower in
repayment priority than the secured debt holders, they assume more risk, and this
premium compensates these investors for this additional risk.
A second reason for issuing unsecured financing is the possibility that equity capital may
be unavailable at the time. "The debt window is usually open, while the equity window is
open only occasionally ", said Mr. David Hegarty, President of Health and Retirement
Properties, Inc. Faced with the prospect of acquiring a $320 million portfolio from the
Marriot Corporation, Health and Retirement Properties had to devise a financing plan.
"We decided to raise as much equity as the market would take," said Mr. Hegarty. "We
realized that the market would not absorb an equity offering of $320 million in one shot,
so we put together a $175 million equity offering. We had an investment grade tenant in
the portfolio, so we were able to get an investment grade rating from the agencies, and
then issued unsecured debt to cover the rest of the transaction."
4.4 ARE THE COVENANTS ON UNSECURED DEBT MORE OR LESS RESTRICTIVE THAN
THOSE ON SECURED DEBT?
During a review of the unsecured debt covenants, we examine the ramifications from a
growth perspective, since the REIT industry has traditionally been one of growth.
"Unsecured debt covenants, as written, look far less constraining
than ones written in a secured debt agreement.... The practical
effect of covenants on secured property is that there are very few
constraints imposed on corporate behavior."3 5
The implication is that unsecured debt covenants, by their very nature, are imposed at the
corporate level, and need to be addressed on an individual REIT basis. Take for example
Health and Retirement Properties. Prior to its unsecured debt offering, it had a
conservative Debt-Equity ratio of 0.16. The covenants on its unsecured debt offering
limits its Debt-Equity ratio to 1.5, so considerable room remains for the addition of
further debt into its capital structure. Furthermore, the addition of this unsecured debt
offering raised the Debt-Equity ratio to 0.26, well within the region that the REIT
industry finds attractive.
Apart from the REIT-specific restrictions that are imposed by unsecured debt, everyone
agrees that the issuance of unsecured debt has introduced a new watch-dog - the rating
agencies. Once the REIT issues unsecured debt, it needs to be more conservative than it
might otherwise have been in order to maintain its credit rating. This concerns corporate
behavior, whereas the secured financing specifically deals with asset specific behavior.
The REIT must maintain conservative debt levels so as to keep its Debt Service Coverage
Ratio (DSCR) at similarly conservative levels. On the offering prospectae that were
examined in the course of this thesis, the minimum Debt Service Coverage Ratios varied
from 1.5:1 to 2.0:1, though clearly the REIT would suffer from a downgrade by the rating
agencies well before the DSCR reached these levels.
3 Mr. Bernard Winograd, CFO of The Taubman Company.
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The effects of a rating downgrade are widespread. Not only will the future cost of debt
capital, both secured and unsecured, get more expensive, but also the present cost of
unsecured debt capital rises. Furthermore, the required rate of return on equity will also
rise in order to compensate for the increased risk and earnings volatility.
4.5 WILL REITS CONTINUE TO USE UNSECURED DEBT?
Everyone I spoke with agreed that the REIT market and REITs' use of unsecured debt
will continue to expand. As mentioned previously, REITs must constantly return to the
external capital markets. Reducing a REIT's dividends, while advantageous to the extent
that it provides the REIT with a certain amount of internal capital, will not reduce the
REIT's dependence upon external markets to any great extent. Mr. Wolstein remarked,
"Reducing dividends is purely a cosmetic activity. If we reduce our
payout ratio, we can maybe save up to $20 million per year. We
spend an average of $200 million on acquisitions every year, so a
reduced payout ratio will provide, at a maximum, 10% of our
annual capital needs."
Unsecured debt is not for every REIT. The CFO must look carefully at the REIT's
business focus and examine whether or not his REIT can operate successfully within the
corporate confines of these covenants and the additional scrutiny of the rating agencies.
CONCLUSION
This thesis has attempted to explore the rationale for issuing unsecured debt and the
ramifications for the REIT industry. In order to do so, two statistical analyses on REIT
stocks were conducted. The first was an analysis of the REIT stock price reactions to
announcements of initial public offerings of unsecured debt. The second was a statistical
regression of the abnormal returns obtained in the first analysis against several financial
characteristics of the REIT. The results of both analyses suggest that REIT stocks react
negatively to these IPO announcements. These negative reactions provide evidence in
support of several theories presented by academics in the field of corporate finance. The
first theory, presented by Myers, argues that firms with growth opportunities should
maintain a low level of debt in their capital structure. The negative reactions elicited in
the study suggest that REITs which issue unsecured debt may be signaling lower growth
opportunities in the future.
The second theory, presented in various forms by Maris & Elayan, Jaffe, and Howe &
Shilling, argues that taxable investors are financially better off investing in all-equity
REITs. The negative returns suggest that the majority of REIT investors are taxable
individuals, who decide to liquidate their holdings when the REIT announces its intention
to issue unsecured debt.
The ramifications of these negative stock price reactions were discussed with respect to
the growth of the REIT industry. Taken at face value, they simply provide further
evidence of the maturity and evolution of the industry. While this in itself is not a
negative point, it does however mean that we will probably not see the industry achieve
the near-term growth expected by Mr. Mark Decker, President of NAREIT, when he said,
"While it is not likely that the REIT industry will progress to a
trillion dollar total asset industry, I believe it will reach the $200
to $500 billion asset threshold in the next 10 to 20 years.,36
This study of the REIT investor's perception of unsecured debt was counterbalanced by
interviews with REIT professionals. Among the topics discussed were the health of the
industry and the increasing use of unsecured debt in REITs. The general consensus was
that the rapid growth of the REIT industry has come and gone, and it is now entering a
period of maturity.
There is agreement that it is rational to include debt in certain REITs' capital structure.
The presence of debt, secured or unsecured, and the amount thereof, depend upon several
factors, including the REIT's investor profile and the asset quality and mix.
The arguments presented were analyzed and found to conform to modern capital theory if
certain assumptions are made. In the light of evidence existing in the market, these
assumptions may be valid. However, I am not fully convinced that the consequences of
default under unsecured debt are being fully considered. I would argue that unsecured
debt will force the REIT to adopt more conservative behavior than it otherwise would,
causing a further reduction in the REIT's growth prospects. This is not only due to the
additional scrutiny of the rating agencies, but also the risk characteristics of unsecured
debt.
5.1 AREAS OF FUTURE STUDY
While this study has provided us with some thought-provoking results, another useful
study might be to investigate the purpose of the REIT's issuance of unsecured debt. If a
REIT uses the proceeds to retire existing higher cost debt, secured or otherwise, then the
36 NAREIT. "The REIT Report." Vol. 8, No. 3. 1993
market may look upon this announcement favorably. If, on the other hand, the REIT uses
the proceeds to simply add more debt to its capital structure, then the proposed debt level
in the REIT's capital structure should be ascertained, and the market reaction to this
announcement should be investigated. However, a study of this nature should not be
undertaken until the sample of REITs offering unsecured debt has reached a significant
size.
DAY AEC
AAR CAR
-5 1.495% 1.495%
-4 -0.063% 1.433%
-3 -0.099% 1.333%
-2 1.014% 2.347%
-1 -0.504% 1.843%
1 0.653% 3.277%
2 -0.801% 2.476%
3 -0.959% 1.516%
4 0.810% 2.326%
5 -0.620% 1.706%
6 0.005% 1.711%
7 -0.019% 1.692%
8 1.388% 3.080%
9 -0.570% 2.510%
10 -0.407% 2.103%
DAY FRT
AAR CAR
-5 -0.963% -0.963%
-4 1.174% 0.210%
-3 -0.771% -0.561%
-2 0.498% -0.063%
-1 -3.233% -3.295%
1 0.545% -2.839%
2 2.229% -0.610%
3 -3.188% -3.798%
4 -0.215% -4.013%
5 -0.611% -4.624%
6 0.995% -3.629%
7 0.306% -3.323%
8 -0.861% -4.184%
9 -1.314% -5.498%
10 0.205% -5.293%
AHE
AAR CAR
-0.000%
-0.000%
-0.143% -0.143%
-2.112% -2.255%
1.530% -0.725%
1.264% -1.214%
1.301% 0.087%
1.153% 1.240%
-0.991% 0.249%
0.037% 0.285%
-2.288% -2.003%
0.857% -1.146%
0.292% -0.854%
2.634% 1.780%
2.040% 3.820%
FUR
AAR CAR
1.170% 1.170%
-1.100% 0.070%
1.178% 1.248%
-2.272% -1.025%
2.335% 1.310%
1.158% 0.214%
2.317% 2.531%
-1.099% 1.432%
1.160% 2.592%
-1.118% 1.473%
0.017% 1.490%
0.018% 1.508%
2.292% 3.801%
-1.086% 2.715%
0.011% 2.726%]
DDR
AAR CAR
0.591% 0.591%
-0.734% -0.143%
-1.585% -1.728%
1.422% -0.306%
1.057% 0.751%
-1.183% 1.093%
0.264% 1.357%
-0.330% 1.028%
-0.390% 0.638%
1.042% 1.680%
0.945% 2.626%
3.735% 6.361%
1.805% 8.166%
1.868% 10.034%
0.157% 10.191%1
HCP
AAR CAR
-0.135% -0.135%
-0.035% -0.170%
0.857% 0.688%
-1.094% -0.406%
0.689% 0.283%
-0.586% -3.096%
-0.009% -3.106%
0.017% -3.089%
0.882% -2.207%
-0.081% -2.288%
-0.071% -2.359%
-1.024% -3.382%
1.346% -2.036%
1.897% -0.139%
-3.386% -3.525%
EQR
AAR CAR
3.011% 3.011%
2.043% 5.054%
-0.584% 4.470%
0.094% 4.564%
-0.971% 3.593%
-1.645% -0.512%
-2.471% -2.983%
-0.297% -3.280%
0.466% -2.814%
-0.095% -2.909%
-0.448% -3.358%
-1.758% -5.116%
0.494% -4.622%
-2.946% -7.567%
-0.003% -7.570%
HRP
AAR CAR
0.084% 0.084%
0.808% 0.892%
-0.760% 0.132%
-1.137% -1.005%
-0.306% -1.311%
-1.604% -2.309%
1.019% -1.289%
-0.401% -1.690%
-0.330% -2.021%
1.265% -0.756%
-0.208% -0.965%
0.351% -0.613%
-0.321% -0.935%
1.169% 0.234%
-4.399% -4.165%
C,,
DAY KIM
AAR CAR
-5 0.000%
-4 -0.747% -0.747%
-3 -1.840% -2.587%
-2 -1.300% -3.887%
-1 -0.716% -4.602%
1 0.992% -4.937%
2 -0.364% -5.301%
3 -0.828% -6.129%
4 -0.290% -6.419%
5 0.038% -6.381%
6 0.018% -6.363%
7 -1.738% -8.101%
8 -1.253% -9.354%
9 -0.259% -9.613%
10 -1.317% -10.930%
DAY PTR
AAR CAR
-5 0.931% 0.931%
-4 -0.230% 0.701%
-3 0.196% 0.897%
-2 0.521% 1.418%
-1 -1.616% -0.198%
1 1.735% 1.941%
2 2.881% 4.822%
3 1.083% 5.905%
4 1.085% 6.990%
5 0.218% 7.208%
6 -2.021% 5.187%
7 0.685% 5.872%
8 0.561% 6.432%
9 -1.162% 5.271%
10 1.050% 6.321%1
ROUS
AAR CAR
0.021% 0.021%
-1.784% -1.762%
1.707% -0.055%
1.908% 1.852%
0.054% 1.906%
0.252% 1.174%
-1.407% -0.233%
2.681% 2.447%
-2.748% -0.301%
0.618% 0.318%
1.758% 2.075%
-2.378% -0.303%
-0.185% -0.487%
0.021% -0.466%
-0.234% -0.700%
MT
AAR CAR
3.208% 3.208%
-1.575% 1.633%
-0.373% 1.260%
0.041% 1.301%
2.098% 3.399%
-1.731% 4.155%
-0.392% 3.764%
-1.920% 1.844%
-0.470% 1.374%
2.050% 3.424%
1.557% 4.981%
0.593% 5.575%
-0.672% 4.903%
-2.125% 2.778%
1.449% 4.227%,
SCN
AAR CAR
1.583% 1.583%
0.018% 1.600%
0.629% 2.229%
-0.665% 1.564%
0.051% 1.615%
0.784% -1.318%
0.731% -0.587%
3.920% 3.333%
-0.747% 2.586%
-0.006% 2.580%
3.017% 5.596%
0.008% 5.605%
-0.066% 5.539%
0.025% 5.564%
-1.455% 4.109%1
NPR
AAR CAR
0.669% 0.669%
0.368% 1.037%
-0.603% 0.434%
0.036% 0.470%
-0.495% -0.025%
-1.590% -1.496%
0.587% -0.908%
0.942% 0.034%
-0.982% -0.947%
1.236% 0.289%
-0.510% -0.221%
0.042% -0.179%
-0.466% -0.646%
-0.584% -1.230%
-0.034% -1.264%,
TCO
AAR CAR
3.176% 3.176%
4.080% 7.255%
-4.055% 3.200%
-0.423% 2.777%
0.026% 2.803%
-2.561% -4.703%
8.936% 4.234%
-4.209% 0.024%
-0.865% -0.840%
-0.840% -1.681%
-2.524% -4.204%
2.637% -1.567%
1.727% 0.160%
-0.026% 0.134%
-0.039% 0.096%
DAY TEE
AAR CAR
-5 -2.237% -2.237%
-4 0.063% -2.175%
-3 1.338% -0.837%
-2 3.557% 2.720%
-1 0.611% 3.331%
1 2.785% 6.669%
2 0.687% 7.356%
3 -2.369% 4.986%
4 5.533% 10.519%
5 -6.238% 4.281%
6 -0.159% 4.122%
7 -0.562% 3.560%
8 -0.047% 3.514%
9 -0.030% 3.484%
10 -0.092% 3.392%
DAY WRP
AAR CAR
-5 -0.964% -0.964%
-4 -0.983% -1.947%
-3 -0.519% -2.466%
-2 1.541% -0.925%
-1 0.857% -0.068%
1 0.243% 2.287%
2 0.784% 3.071%
3 -0.363% 2.708%
4 0.221% 2.929%
5 -0.342% 2.587%
6 -.999% 1.588%
7 2.030% 3.618%
8 2.999% 6.617%
9 -2.643% 3.974%
10 1.277% 5.251%
UDR
AAR CAR
0.996% 0.996%
0.319% 1.315%
-0.574% 0.741%
1.419% 2.160%
0.600% 2.761%
-0.568% 1.607%
-0.452% 1.155%
0.143% 1.297%
0.363% 1.660%
-0.424% 1.236%
0.489% 1.725%
0.481% 2.206%
-0.030% 2.175%
0.798% 2.973%
0.542% 3.515%
WIR
AAR CAR
-0.629% -0.629%
0.146% -0.484%
4.114% 3.630%
0.105% 3.735%
3.014% 6.749%
1.174% 12.798%
1.786% 14.585%
2.788% 17.373%
-2.057% 15.315%
0.123% 15.438%
-1.557% 13.881%
-1.440% 12.441%
-0.705% 11.736%
-0.628% 11.107%
0.126% 11.233%
WRI
AAR CAR
-0.692% -0.692%
-0.418% -1.110%
-0.156% -1.266%
0.278% -0.988%
-0.951% -1.939%
0.363% -2.169%
-1.675% -3.844%
-0.690% -4.535%
-0.721% -5.255%
-0.723% -5.978%
0.654% -5.324%
0.691% -4.633%
0.406% -4.227%
0.669% -3.558%
1.419% -2.139%
Amount A=1 B=0 HC=1
Ticker AAR ($M) Fixed Rating Term (Yrs) Assets ($M) Amt/Assets Type
AEC 0.781% 75 1 0 5 268.00 0.28 0
AHE -1.753% 100 1 0 9 515.00 0.19 1
DDR 1.526% 100 0 0 1 534.00 0.19 0
EQR -2.459% 125 1 0 5 760.00 0.16 0
FRT -0.089% 100 1 0 5 754.00 0.13 0
FUR -2.255% 100 1 0 10 350.00 0.29 0
HCP -2.793% 75 1 0 8 400.00 0.19 1
HRP 0.607% 125 0 0 5 691.00 0.18 1
KIM -1.326% 100 1 1 10 531.00 0.19 0
MRY -1.354% 120 1 0 7 829.00 0.14 0
MT 2.487% 100 1 0 10 762.00 0.13 1
NPR 0.119% 100 1 1 10 678.00 0.15 0
PTR 0.403% 100 1 1 14 890.00 0.11 0
ROUS -2.530% 120 1 0 20 2,940.00 0.04 0
SCN -3.717% 50 1 0 18 1,194.00 0.04 0
TCO -4.944% 200 1 0 5 387.00 0.52 0
TEE 0.552% 50 1 0 10 257.00 0.19 0
UDR -0.586% 52 1 0 5 390.00 0.13 0
WIR 4.875% 50 1 0 10 309.00 0.16 0
WRI -0.593% 25 1 1 5 688.00 0.04 0
WRP 2.113% 100 0 0 7 506.00 0.20 0
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.614286981
R Square. 0.377348495
Adj. R Sq. 0.11049785
Std. Error 0.021451993
Observations 21
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 6 0.0039045 0.0006507 1.4140813 0.276789399
Residual 14 0.0064426 0.0004602
Total 20 0.0103471
Std. Error t Stat
0.0205122
0.0152707
0.0132164
0.0016026
1.275E-05
0.0580199
0.0125476
P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.000% Upper 95.000%
0.003845049
-0.057002384
-0.031377563
-0.002842487
-5.05527E-05
-0.237431652
-0.031620183
0.091833674
0.008502622
0.025315233
0.004032077
4.15449E-06
0.011449174
0.022203538
0.003845049
-0.057002384
-0.031377563
-0.002842487
-5.05527E-05
-0.237431652
-0.031620183
0.091833674
0.008502622
0.025315233
0.004032077
4.15449E-06
0.011449174
0.022203538
Coefficients
Intercept
Fixed
Rating
Term (Yrs)
Assets ($M)
Amt/Assets
Type
0.047839361
-0.02424988
-0.00303116
0.000594795
-2.3199E-05
-0.11299124
-0.00470832
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